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EXPANDING VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 










Budget is one of the most important economic tools available at the disposal of 
governments. The methods of revenue collection and the patterns of expenditure that 
are adopted in the budget go a long way towards determining both the rate at which an 
economy will create wealth and the manner in which it will distribute wealth among 
different groups of people. This is especially true when one considers the cumulative 
effects of annual budgets over a period of time. There are of course other tools of 
government policy that usually fall outside the purview of the budget but can have a 
significant influence on the creation and distribution of wealth – for example, 
monetary policy, labour market policies, regulatory policy for trade and investment, 
policies regarding property rights and enforcement of contracts, and a whole range of 
institution-building activities. The effects of most of these policies, however, do get 
reflected in the budget in one way or the other. In any case, the sheer range of effects 
the budget can have on the structure of incentives and the allocation of resources 
makes it perhaps the most potent instrument of government policy.  
 
While budgets can thus have a profound effect on the well-being of the people, the 
people generally have very little say in the formulation of budgets. In all societies, 
democratic or otherwise, budget preparation has traditionally been almost an 
exclusive prerogative of the executive. The legislature sometimes participates, but 
generally towards the very end of the process and with varying degrees of influence. 
The wider public, however, has remained virtually excluded. Moreover, the budgetary 
process tends to remain shrouded in extreme secrecy, unmatched by any other aspect 
of government activity with the sole exception of matters related to national security.  
 
The combination of seclusion with secrecy renders the budgetary process one of the 
most obscure aspects of governance. This veil of obscurity is not just a minor irritant, 
however. Seclusion stifles voice and secrecy dilutes accountability – together they 
open the way for abuse of power, whose victims are generally the most vulnerable 
groups in the society. The attribute of seclusion does not constrain all segments of the 
society equally. Those in a position to exercise power – either political or financial – 
can often find their way to the ears of those in charge of formulating the budget. The 
disadvantaged groups, who lack power and access, cannot do so. They fail to have 
any sort of voice – let alone an effective one – in the making of the budget. The 
attribute of secrecy then renders it difficult to hold the government accountable for its 
actions. Even if the budget offers a palpably raw deal to some groups, it is easy for the 
government to get away with it by arguing that there were no other feasible 
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alternatives consistent with the stated goals, because secrecy ensures that outsiders 
have no knowledge of what alternatives were actually available. The traditional 
budgetary process – characterised as it is by seclusion and secrecy – is thus inherently 
antithetical to the ideal of good governance, for which voice and accountability are 
essential preconditions.  
 
It follows that if good governance is to be promoted, through the expansion of voice 
and accountability, then the budgetary process should be a prime target for change. 
This will not be easy, because the vested interests that have benefited from traditional 
practices will stand in the way. But changes have begun to occur. In a growing 
number of countries, seeds are being sown for a more inclusive and a more 
transparent budgetary process. This is happening partly through enlightened 
government actions following democratisation of erstwhile undemocratic polities, but 
mainly through bold and innovative actions by civil society organisations. This paper 
reviews some of the experience that is being spawned by this wind of change. The 
objective is to draw some lessons regarding the preconditions that need to be met and 
the methods that need to be adopted for effectively expanding voice and 
accountability in the budgetary process. Section II deals with the issue of voice, 
section III is concerned with accountability, and section IV brings the arguments 
together to draw some lessons. 
 
 
II. Expanding Voice through the Budgetary Process 
 
Budget is one of the most important arenas of decision-making in which the 
potentially conflicting interests of different groups of the society have to be 
confronted with each other. This is true about every aspect of budget formulation, the 
most obvious case being that of allocation of public expenditure. Any decision on the 
pattern of allocation necessarily involves a decision as to whose interests are to be 
given precedence over the interests of others. But a similar confrontation of interests 
also arises in the context of financing the expenditure. For example, when the 
government wants to raise a certain amount of revenue, it will find that there are many 
alternative ways of doing so, each with its own distribution of tax incidence. Some 
groups will sacrifice more than others, in terms of paying taxes, depending on which 
alternative is chosen. Similarly, when the government wants to run a deficit budget, it 
will find that there are several alternative ways of financing the deficit, and each 
financing mechanism will entail its own distribution of welfare among the people. 
Experience suggests, for example, that inflationary financing of the deficit will 
typically harm the poorer segments relatively more.  
 
One could argue, therefore, that confronting opposing interests is the very 
quintessence of the budgetary process. In whose favour this confrontation will be 
resolved will depend in part on whose interests are better represented in this process 
i.e., whose voice is heard louder and stronger. Typically, the poor and the 
marginalised segments of the society have no direct voice in this process at all – 
thanks to the feature of seclusion that characterises budget formulation almost 
everywhere. Where some form of democracy exists, the legislature is supposed to act 
as an indirect mechanism for expressing their voice, but in practice it often turns out 
to be a very poor substitute of direct voice. It is the rich and the powerful who manage 
to represent their interests better. Unless this state of affairs is fundamentally altered   3
so that the poor and the marginalised groups can have a better voice in the budgetary 
process, the development process will continue to remain unjust.  
 
It is of course true that having a voice is not sufficient for making sure that one’s 
interests will be safeguarded. For it is entirely possible that a voice will be heard but 
not listened to. Voice can be effective only when people have sufficient power to 
influence decision-making and to hold the decision-makers accountable for their 
actions. These issues of empowerment and accountability will be addressed below, 
but it is important to recognise at this stage that having a voice is a necessary first 
step. The groups that are traditionally excluded from the budgetary process must find 
a way of bringing their voice to the table first so as to confront their interests against 
those of others if there is to be any chance of safeguarding their interests. The 
unfortunate fact of life is that even this first step proves a step too far for most of 
them.  
 
In order to safeguard their interests the excluded groups must be able to express their 
voice at several stages of the budgetary process. As an organising principle, one can 
identify three stages at which having a voice may be of crucial importance – the stage 
of preference revelation, the stage of conflict resolution, and the stage of impact 
evaluation. In the first stage, people are to express what they want; in the second stage 
they are to participate in the process of reconciling conflicting interests of various 
groups; and in the final stage they are to articulate what they think to be the successes 
or failures of the authorities concerned. There are hopeful signs from different parts of 
the world that the groups that are traditionally excluded from the budgetary process 
are slowly but surely beginning to express their voice in all three stages. 
 
Voice in Preference Revelation 
 
The stage of preference revelation is the very first stage. Formulation of any budget 
necessarily involves consideration of alternatives – e.g., alternative ways of raising 
revenue, alternative ways of spending revenue, alternative ways of financing the 
deficit if there is any, alternative ways of disposing of surplus if there is any, and so 
on. When these alternatives are being considered, or even before their formal 
consideration begins, it is essential that all social groups be able to say what they want 
– i.e., to reveal their preferences over possible alternatives.  
 
This is important from the point of view of both equity and efficiency. The equity 
concern is obvious enough – if the marginalised groups are unable to reveal their 
preferences, it is very likely that their interests will continue to be ignored. The 
concern with efficiency arises from the fact that unless the preferences are known, 
even a well-meaning government may not be able to allocate resources in a way that 
best meets the needs of the people; this will result in inefficient allocation of 
resources. In the private sector of the economy, preferences are revealed and catered 
to indirectly, through the price mechanism. But no such indirect mechanism exists in 
the public sphere.
1 If the allocation of public resources is to respect the preferences of 
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the marginalised groups, or any group for that matter, then those groups must be able 
to reveal their preferences directly. Hence the importance of voice in preference 
revelation.  
 
There are many alternative channels through which the voice of the stakeholders can 
be made audible. Civil society organisations are perhaps best placed to take the lead 
in this matter, but so can academic institutions; even a government committed to 




In perhaps the most elaborate process of preference revelation conducted by the civil 
society, the South African National NGO Coalition has recently co-ordinated a two-
year process of poverty hearings throughout the length and breadth of the country. 
These public hearings gave the poor everywhere an opportunity to express what they 
want. Their revealed preferences were then systematically collated into a set of 
coherent priorities and delivered to the government for consideration during the 
process of budget formulation.  
 
In Kenya, the lead has been taken by an academic institution, namely the Institute for 
Economic Affairs. It organises civil society meetings every year with a view to 
providing inputs to the budgetary process. The meetings are attended by a wide range 
of stakeholders, not just the poor; and the voice of the poor is probably heard more 
through others representing the poor than directly through the poor themselves. 
Nevertheless, these annual meetings have for the first time provided an opportunity 
for the poor to put their preferences on to the agenda. The process has by now 
acquired sufficient legitimacy for even the government to request the Institute for 
their findings as a regular input into the drafting of the budget. 
 
The most prominent case of a democratic government taking the initiative on its own 
is Uganda. After decades of authoritarian rule, Uganda had the first taste of 
participatory democracy when the National Resistance Movement came to power in 
1986. From its earliest days, the new government tried to involve various components 
of the civil society in a participatory approach towards priority setting for poverty 
reduction plans. The poor themselves were not directly involved in this exercise at the 
beginning. But that changed in the 1990s, when under the HIPC initiative the 
government of Uganda set about formulating a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) through a remarkably inclusive process. In order to identify the priorities that 
should guide the PRSP, the government set up the Uganda Participatory Poverty 
Assessment Project (UPPAP). Under this project, which was piloted in ten districts, 
evidence was collected from the poor people as to how they themselves perceived 
poverty and what their own priorities were for action against poverty. The preferences 
revealed by the poor through this process have played a prominent role in shaping the 
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Voice in Conflict Resolution 
 
Once the preferences have been revealed, the next stage is to fight for one’s corner in 
the struggle between opposing preferences. Given the fact that resources are always 
scarce, it will never be possible to satisfy all groups fully, no matter how skilfully a 
budget is crafted. A certain amount of give and take must occur and compromises will 
have to be made. In that sense the budgetary process is essentially a bargaining 
process, even if the nature of bargaining is often implicit and incomplete. The process 
is implicit in the sense that different groups of people seldom come together to thrash 
out a compromise through an explicit exchange of views. Much of the bargaining 
takes place surreptitiously, under the cloak of secrecy, whereby pressure is exerted 
directly or indirectly on the authorities in charge of formulating the budget. The 
process is incomplete in the sense that not all groups can participate in this act of 
surreptitious bargaining. Only those who have sufficient political or financial clout to 
carve out an avenue to the corridors of power can do so. Almost by definition, this 
leaves out the marginalised groups. The bargaining process is, therefore, highly 
asymmetrical.  
 
The importance of voice in this context is best understood by combining some 
elementary concepts of game theory with the notions of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ introduced 
by Hirschman. In the standard asymmetric bargaining models of game theory, the 
outcome of the bargaining process depends on three sets of factors - the preferences of 
the bargaining parties, their breakdown position, and the degree of asymmetry in their 
bargaining power. With given preferences, the latter two turn out to be the crucial 
parameters that determine how favourable the final bargaining outcome will be for 
different parties. Breakdown position refers to the position where a bargaining party 
would be if the bargaining process were to fail. A party with a strong breakdown 
position can gain advantage in the bargaining process by threatening to walk away 
from the table if its demands are not met. It knows that if the negotiations were to 
break down as a result of its ‘exit’, those with weaker breakdown positions would 
suffer more as a consequence. These weaker parties would, therefore, have an 
incentive to make compromises in favour of the party threatening to exit, in order to 
keep the bargaining process alive. This threat of ‘exit’ is a ploy that is routinely used 
by negotiators in bargaining situations.  
 
It is obvious, however, that in a bargaining game involving the budget, the threat of 
‘exit’ is not an option. If a party threatens to exit, the bargaining process will not 
break down, the budget will still be formulated; all that will happen is that the party in 
question will have to exit empty-handed. In this situation, the only way to strengthen 
one’s position is to exercise ‘voice’ – by staying in the bargaining room and arguing 
for one’s case as loudly and as persuasively as possible. Those who can exercise their 
voice better will, other things remaining the same, change in their favour the third 
factor determining the bargaining outcome – namely, the degree of asymmetry in 
bargaining power. It is inevitable that the marginalised groups will find themselves at 
the wrong end of the asymmetry to begin with. Only by exercising voice can they 
begin to redress this initial disadvantage and make the outcome of the budgetary 
process more favourable towards them than it would otherwise be. 
 
The most remarkable instance of this idea being put into practice is the municipal 
budget of the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil. In a revolutionary change in the   6
budgetary process initiated in 1989 by Mayor Olivio Dutra, the budget of the 
municipality is now prepared through an elaborate participatory process involving 
citizens from all walks of life, including the poor. Legally, the mayor’s office and the 
elected Chamber of Deputies still remain responsible for defining and approving the 
budget. But most of the details of the budget are actually worked out by a three-tier 
institutional structure involving popular participation.  
 
The lowest tier is composed of a number of plenary assemblies whose function is to 
allow the citizenry to reveal their preferences. There are thematic assemblies and 
regional assemblies. The thematic assemblies elicit people’s preferences about 
resource allocations within specific sectors such as transportation, education, health, 
social welfare, etc. The regional assemblies collate citizens’ opinions about what 
needs to be done for the overall development of their specific localities.  
 
One these revealed preferences are collated in a systematic manner, they are passed 
on to the next two tiers – the Fora of Delegates and the Council of the Preparatory 
Budget, which are smaller bodies whose members are elected by the plenary 
assemblies. The Councillors are charged with the delicate task of ranking the various 
demands put forward by the assemblies and to recommend allocation of funds. This is 
the stage of conflict resolution and the participation of the poor in the whole process, 
starting from attending the assemblies to electing the Councillors, has ensured that 
their interests would not be sacrificed. Indeed, the Council operates a weighting 
system that gives precedence to poor-oriented projects while allocating scarce funds. 
 
The results speak for themselves. When the experiment of participatory budgeting 
was first started in 1989, the city was in a precarious financial state owing to pressures 
of de-industrialisation, influx of migrants from rural areas, and a legacy of financial 
crisis stemming from high debt burden and widespread tax evasion. Despite these 
impediments, between 1989 and 1996, the number of households with access to water 
services went up from 80 per cent to 98 per cent, and the percentage of population 
with access to sewage facilities more than doubled - from 46 per cent to 85 per cent. 
During the same period, the number of children enrolled in public school also doubled 
(de Dousa Santos 1998; Cagatay et al. 2000). 
 
 
Voice in Impact Evaluation 
 
To formulate a budget is one thing, to implement it is another. Traditionally, budgets 
have discriminated against the poor and the marginalised groups not only by 
providing less for them at the stage of formulation, but also by not giving them their 
due at the stage of implementation. There are numerous instances where the ration 
that was supposed to feed the needy had found its way in the black market, the 
medicine that was supposed to come to a rural clinic had just disappeared, and the 
road that was supposed to be built to provide market access to people living in remote 
areas had collapsed even before it was completed. Most of these incidents occur due 
to corrupt practices, or sheer negligence, rather than to genuine contingencies beyond 
the control of implementing agencies. To bring the instances of such malpractice out 
into the open is a necessary first step towards eradicating them.  
   7
The media and the civil society can play an important role here. Their role will be 
elaborated in the next section, where we discuss the conditions for enhancing 
accountability. But the poor themselves must raise their voice in protest against things 
such as missing ration, vanishing medicine and collapsing roads, if their interests are 
to be safeguarded in the budgetary process. The general point is that the poor must be 
able to let the authorities know in what way budgets have actually affected their lives. 
When they are able to voice their own evaluation of the budget’s impact in terms of 
their life experiences, the effect can be much more telling than anything that can be 
achieved by an expert evaluation in terms of bare statistics. This is not meant to 
denigrate statistical evaluations, which are an essential tool for improving 
performance. But there is a strong case for supplementing them with the more vivid 
evaluations offered by the poor when they give voice to their life experiences as 
evidence of the budget’s impact. 
 
This idea has recently spawned a new practice called social auditing, an outstanding 
example of which can be found in one of the poorest regions in the Indian state of 
Rajasthan. The leading actor is a mass-based organisation called Mazdoor Kishan 
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS; translated as Movement for the Empowerment of Peasants 
and Workers). It all began when MKSS first noted a discrepancy between the 
minimum wage officially sanctioned and the wages actually being paid to the workers 
and peasants. This discovery alerted the organisation to the possibility that many local 
government (panchayat) expenditures are not made according to plans. It wanted to 
match plan allocations to actual expenditures, but found it extremely difficult to 
obtain the necessary information. It took nearly seven years to prepare the 
documentation that made a prima facie case that corruption was widespread.  
 
But not content with prima facie evidence, MKSS decided to check the validity of 
official records against the actual experiences of the villagers. Starting in December 
1994, it began to hold public hearings, in which everyone, including elected 
representatives and local government officials were invited to attend. In these 
hearings, detailed accounts of official records were read out in public, who were then 
asked to testify whether their own experiences were congruent with what the records 
claimed to have achieved. The testimonies revealed striking discrepancies. For 
example, these hearings revealed that many villagers who had been listed as 
beneficiaries of anti-poverty programmes had never received any payment and that 
local contractors had received payments for works that were never performed (Jenkins 
and Goetz 1999). The effect of all this did not remain confined to mere revelation of 
corruption. In some cases, these hearings led to irresistible public pressure on corrupt 
officials to return the embezzled funds and also acted as a deterrent to further 
corruption (Roy 1997). By exercising their own voice in impact evaluation, the poor 
had thus made sure they would benefit more from the use of local government funds 
than they had traditionally done.  
 
At the national level, the voice of the poor in impact evaluation is heard most 
prominently in Uganda. In 1998, the Ugandan government established a Poverty 
Action Fund (PAF) as a mechanism for monitoring the use of funds released by the 
HIPC initiative and other programmes for poverty alleviation. The Fund involves civil 
society organizations in selecting projects for evaluation and in the actual task of 
evaluation itself. This task is co-ordinated by a coalition called the Uganda Debt 
Network, which undertakes periodic field surveys through a team of researchers and   8
community members. The field visits give the researchers the opportunity to hear 
from the people themselves whether and to what extent the intended beneficiaries had 
actually benefited. In a short period of time, this initiative has helped to identify and 
then to remove many problems, resulting in increased funding to poverty relief 
programmes and shifting of expenditure to priority sectors (Krafchik,  ). 
 
 
III. Expanding Accountability Through the Budgetary Process 
 
If the interests of the poor are to be safeguarded in the budgetary process, it is 
essential that they have a voice in what goes into the budget and what comes out of it. 
But the mere expansion of voice is never going to be enough to protect the poor if the 
budget-making authorities cannot be held accountable for their actions. If the 
authorities disregard the interests of the poor, then either the poor themselves or 
someone on their behalf must be able to make the authorities answer for it. In short, 
people must be empowered to secure their rights – empowerment and accountability 
are two sides of the same coin. Expanding accountability, therefore, presupposes 
expanding empowerment. 
 
Empowering the powerless is necessarily a slow process, except in the aftermath of a 
social revolution. But this process can be strengthened and accelerated by taking 
appropriate social actions. The most important of these actions have to do with the 
promotion of three essential pre-requisites of accountability – viz. transparency, 
participation, and knowledge. Transparency is essential for accountability because it 
will enable people to determining who is responsible for what. Participation will give 
the people the opportunity to exercise their own power to hold the authorities to 





Even though a particular department may be officially the home of a budget – for 
example, the Ministry of Finance in the case of national budgets - the whole process 
of formulating as well as implementing the budget is actually a collective enterprise 
involving a large number of individuals and agencies. Given the veil of secrecy 
behind which budget work normally takes place, it is practically impossible for 
outsiders to know who is responsible for what. This lack of transparency about the 
budgetary process is a serious stumbling block towards ensuring greater 
accountability. Legislative and executive actions are needed to make the budgetary 
process more transparent so that responsibilities can be more clearly assigned and the 
culpability for failure more easily attached to specific agencies and individuals. 
 
South Africa is an outstanding example of progressive actions of this kind. Since the 
democratic election in 1994, the South African budget process has been significantly 
reformed to make it more transparent. The following measures were especially helpful 
in bringing about this transformation. 
 
•  The new Constitution, enacted in 1996, called for specific measures to 
translate the ideal of transparency in the entire area of governance – including 
the budgetary process – into practice.   9
 
•  In 1997, the executive embarked on a drive to introduce performance-oriented 
management, combined with devolution of power. 
 
•  A legal framework was created for the division of revenue and assignment of 
roles and responsibilities between spheres of government. 
 
•  In February 1999, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) was passed 
with a view to establishing stringent transparency requirements, including 
regular reporting and the assignment of accountability.  
 
•  An Amendment of PFMA, enacted in March 1999, extended the requirements 
of PFMA to the sub-national levels of government. 
 
 
Few other developing countries have gone as far as South Africa. But those who wish 
to proceed in the direction of greater transparency can draw upon not just the 
experience of South Africa but also a lot of groundwork that has already been done in 
the recent past by institutions such as the European Union, OECD and the IMF for 
clarifying the requirements of a transparent budget. Of special significance is the IMF 
code of Good Practices for Fiscal Transparency, which gives detailed practical 
guidelines to establish a sound and viable transparency framework for fiscal policy. 
The codes are designed to fulfil the following specific objectives: (a) roles and 
responsibilities in government should be clear, (b) information on government 
activities should be provided to the public, (c) budget preparation, execution and 
reporting should be undertaken in an open manner, and (d) the integrity of fiscal 
information should be subjected to independent scrutiny.  
 
The IMF codes are very general in nature and they may need to be adapted in specific 
country contexts, but they are as good a starting point as any. Already, these codes are 
being adapted in Africa and Latin America to measure transparency in the budgetary 
process. Pioneering work has been done in this area by the Budget Information 
Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) undertaken in 
collaboration with the International Budget Project (IBP) of the Centre on Budget and 
Policy Priorities in Washington, D. C. IDASA conducts interviews with various 
stakeholders to solicit their views on the degree of transparency they find in different 
aspects of the budgetary process. Analyses based on these interviews have led to a 
scoring system for measuring the degree of transparency in the budget.
3 This system 
has been adapted and applied in at least five Latin American countries – Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, and four African countries – Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria 
and Zambia. While the numerical scores may provide a convenient tool for advocacy, 
the real value of these exercises lies in identifying the areas where transparency is 
limited. The information generated in the process of this identification can provide an 
objective basis for undertaking corrective actions at legislative and executive levels. 
 
 
                                                             
3 For a comprehensive overview of the system developed in South Africa and an analysis of the major 
findings, see Folscher et al. (2000).   10
Participation 
 
The importance of participation for accountability is obvious enough. If people do not 
participate in the decision-making process at some stage, i.e., if budget-making 
continues to remain a secluded exercise, then the budget-makers will find it all too 
easy to hide their actions. This will compromise accountability.  
 
Ideally, participation should take place at every stage of the budgetary process – 
specifically, at the three stages of preference revelation, conflict resolution and impact 
evaluation discussed earlier in the context of ‘voice’. It could be argued, however, that 
even though all three stages are equally important from the point of view of ‘voice’, 
from the point of view of accountability it is the last stage where participation is most 
important. If participation does occur in all three stages, this will enable people to 
hold the authorities accountable by comparing the outcomes of the budgetary process 
with the stated goals in which the people themselves had a say. But even if they had 
no say in setting the goals and participation occurred only in the last stage, it would 
still help people to hold the authorities accountable in terms of the goals set by the 
authorities themselves. This is no mean an achievement in itself, as demonstrated by 
the case of social auditing in Rajasthan discussed in section II.  
 
In fact, participation can enhance accountability even if the poor and the marginalised 
groups themselves have no voice in the budgetary process. Around the world, 
participatory budgeting has been flourishing in the last decade, spurred mainly by the 
success of the Porto Alegre experiment in Brazil (see section II). Not in all cases, 
however, the poor and the marginalised groups are directly involved. In many 
instances, civil society organisations and academic institutions that claim to speak for 
the poor have successfully engaged themselves in a participatory budget process. 





‘Knowledge is power’ is a popular cliché, but it is especially true in the context of 
expanding accountability in the budgetary process. Anyone who has looked into a 
budget document immediately knows how difficult it is to decipher its contents, 
unless one already happens to one of the cognoscenti. The arcane language in which 
the budget is normally couched and the labyrinthine accounting procedures it tends to 
employ create an almost impregnable wall for most outsiders. The result, as one 
prominent social activist engaged in independent budge work has remarked, is that 
“The word ‘budget’ is enough to turn off most social activists” (Mistry, 1999).  
 
But if people do not understand the budget, there is little chance that they would be 
able to either influence the content of the budget or to hold the budget-makers 
accountable for what it contains and how it is implemented. This point was realized 
very early on by a mass-based organization in the Indian state of Gujarat, called the 
Development Initiative for Social and Human Action (DISHA). It was founded in 
1985 with a view to organizing and unionising forest labourers and building capacity 
in local organizations on issues that affected the tribal people. It soon realized, 
however, in the course of its advocacy work that lack of understanding about the 
budget was a severe handicap. In the words of the organsization’s own spokesman:    11
 
“DISHA began to see the need for budget analysis when we lobbied the 
government to raise the collection rate for 1 million tribal Tendu leaf-
plucker women, to regularise land rights for tribal forest land cultivators, 
and on other issues relating to the general welfare of communities living 
in the tribal areas of Gujarat state in Western India. With each struggle, a 
realization grew: unless we had information on the money spent by the 
national and state governments, it would be difficult to fairly represent the 
issues of tribal development. Eventually, this realization forced us to learn 
how to analyze the state budget."”(Mistry 1999). 
 
Many other organizations around the world are discovering the merit of learning how 
to understand the budget. Some of them are actually specialising in the creation and 
dissemination of budget knowledge. These activities fall into two broad categories – 
analysis and training. Analysis itself is of two types – one may be called structural 
analysis and the other impact analysis. All these activities are important for providing 





Structural analysis essentially means translating into plain language what the budget 
document has to say. The first task in this enterprise is to explain the meaning of the 
terms frequently used in a budget document and then to give some idea about the 
accounting procedures so as to achieve certain amount of transparency about the 
contents of a budget. Once the budget is understood, it immediately empowers the 
users by giving them the capacity to subject the budget to independent scrutiny – 
which by itself goes a long way towards expanding accountability. 
 
Spurred by this realization, many independent organisations around the world have 
been trying to make the budget more accessible to outsider. The work of DISHA in 
the Indian state of Gujarat has already been mentioned. The recent work of the 
Institute of Public Finance in Croatia is another successful example. The Institute has 
recently published the first Guide to the Croatian budget. Apart from providing a 
general introduction to the budget and analyzing the major expenditure and revenue 
trends, the Guide also deals with extra-budgetary funds and provides a consolidated 
budget of the entire fiscal operation of the government. The Guide was published at 
the same time as the government’s own budget proposal was being discussed at the 
parliament, and proved a very useful tool for the parliamentarians with which to 
scrutinise those proposals. It has been reported for instance that during the course of 
the parliamentary debate, one of the members of parliament stood up, flashed the 
Guide and said to the Deputy Minister of Finance: “Now we don’t have to (only) 
listen to you anymore, we have a (alternative) guide!” (Krafchik n.d.). 
 
Another illuminating example of how analysis can enhance accountability is a 
campaign launched by the Civic Alliance, a broad coalition of Mexican NGOs, to 
make the President of the country accountable for his ‘secret fund’. In 1994, the Civic 
Alliance began its right-to-information campaign, and specifically targeted the ‘secret 
fund’ for this purpose. After years of legal tussle, in which the President resolutely 
denied to provide the necessary information, the Alliance eventually gained access to   12
detailed budget information with the help of certain progressive members of the 
Congress. Through a painstaking analysis of the overall budget of a number of years, 
the members of the Alliance finally unearthed what the President had tried to hide – 
namely, that the secret fund had grown from $47 million in 1983 to $191 million in 
1994. At the same time, many other irregularities in the salaries and benefits paid to 
the public officials were also revealed. The publicity that this research received in the 
media put enormous pressure on the government. The President, while never yielding 
on the issue of providing information, did decrease the size of the secret fund sharply, 
until allocations to this fund were eliminated entirely. The research on public 
officials’ abuse of discretionary spending was bore fruit, as the federal government 





The potential impact of a budget on specific groups of people cannot be easily 
ascertained. This is because the manner in which the budget is presented does not 
permit a straightforward analysis of its potential impact on specific target groups. The 
focus of a budget is either on macro aggregates or on sectoral allocations. To ascertain 
how the macro and sectoral aggregates translate into costs and benefits for specific 
population groups such as the poor, or women, or some ethnic minorities, is an 
extremely challenging task.  
 
The analysis of a budget’s actual impact is even more difficult. In most countries, 
even though the budget itself is a public document, evaluations of the how different 
provisions of the budget have actually been implemented often lie hidden in 
departmental files or in the auditor-general’s office. Yet, without a proper 
understanding of how the budget has been implemented in relation to its goals, - i.e. 
whether the outcomes have diverged from the goals, and if so, why – it is impossible 
to identify failures, to assign culpability and to hold anyone accountable.  
 
Social auditing of the kind discussed in section II is one example of participatory 
impact analysis. There are many other examples, not all of which are equally 
participatory, but have nevertheless proved to be powerful tools for enhancing 
accountability.  
 
One such case is the Budget Analysis Project launched by the Adva Center of Israel, a 
non-partisan action-oriented policy analysis centre. The project aims to analyze the 
social service allocations of the national budget of Israel via a series of reports entitled 
Looking at the Budget. Its most important moment came in 1998 when the 
government proposed deep cuts in social spending with a view to stimulating 
economic growth. Such cuts included reducing child allowances and old-age 
pensions, abolishing the uniform health care system, limiting eligibility for 
unemployment compensation, providing less support for schools in disadvantaged 
areas, and son on. The Adva Center carefully analysed the potential impact of these 
cuts and concluded that these would result in serious harm to the welfare state and the 
people who depended on it. Armed with their findings, the Centre set upon forging a 
wide coalition around efforts to preserve social services, particularly the public health 
care system. The lobbying activities undertaken by this coalition created such a 
widespread awareness of the deleterious consequences of the spending cuts that it   13
made it difficult for the government to ignore their demands completely. Eventually, 
three important restorations were made in the social services budget. The universal 
package of health services was preserved, cutbacks in teaching hours and housing 
assistance were reduced, and deep cuts in child allowances and old-age pensions were 
withdrawn. 
 
A special kind of impact analysis that has gained a strong momentum in the recent 
years is known as the Gender-sensitive budgeting. The movement first started in 
Australia as a government-led initiative between 1984 and 1996. Within each budget 
cycle, the government departments were asked to produce expenditure analyses of 
their gender impacts. The analysis involved isolating expenditures into three 
categories: 
 
•  Expenditures targeted to groups of men and women, such as expenditure on 
women’s health. 
•  Equal opportunity expenditures by governments agencies. 
•  General budget expenditures to be analysed for their gender impact. 
 
While it was relatively easy to assess the allocation in the first two categories, the 
third component posed a real challenge. A variety of tools were developed for this 
purpose. The Australian experiment has now been terminated as a result of an 
ideological shift in political power, but it has inspired new initiated around the world. 
The prime example is the Commonwealth Secretariat’s Gender Budget Initiative, 
which has in turn spawned such well-known movements as the Women’s budget 
Initiative in Africa and the Gender Budget Initiative in Tanzania. All these 
movements aim at holding the budgetary authorities accountable for the commitments 
they have made in various international fora (such as the Beijing Platform) to make 





Budget training is a natural extension of budget analysis. To be able to analyze the 
budget effectively one has to have highly specialised skills, which most people cannot 
be expected to possess. Yet those who are in a position to influence the budget – such 
as members of the legislature, or social activists, journalists and other influential 
members of the civil society – need to be armed with the basic concepts and major 
findings of the analysis, if they are to play their advocacy roles effectively. Only a 
few might choose to analyse, but many more need to be trained with the help of that 
analysis. 
 
As in most other types of applied budget work by the civil society, South Africa leads 
the field in imparting budget training as well. The Budget Information Service (BIS) 
of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) has already been referred to. 
One of the major programmes of this service is to impart budget training. Initially, its 
work focussed on two primary target groups – legislators and civil society 
organizations. 
 
The idea of educating the legislators originated from the realization that vast majority 
of those elected in 1994 had little experience in parliamentary democracy, having   14
recently emerged from exile or underground internal movements. Yet, within the first 
few weeks of office they were faced with the task of approving a budget they barely 
understood. BIS was the response to this perceived weaknesses of the legislature in 
budgetary matters. The next target group was the thousands of NGOs, who were faced 
with the need to redefine their role from liberation advocacy to economic and social 
advocacy in the post-apartheid regime, but were ill-equipped to do so. Over time, BIS 
came to realize the importance of working with two other actors, the media and the 
executive. By now, BIS has developed a very sophisticated training programme 
geared to the needs of specific target groups. 
 
An academic institution of Mexico, called CIDE, is one of the leading examples in 
Latin America of what can be achieved by way of budget training. As in the case of 
South Africa, the political changes in Mexico in recent years have allowed for more 
open discussion of the national budget than ever before, but the scope and quality of 
discussion was seriously hampered by the lack of knowledge of potential discussants. 
To counter this problem, CIDE has organized several training courses for people 
concerned with the budget process – journalists, government officials, and interested 
members of the civil society. It has also produced information brochures for wider 
dissemination, explaining why budget is important, how budget affects the life of the 
average citizen, and the nature of the budget process. Today, CIDE is regularly 
invited by various institutions such as the Gender and Equity Commission of the 
Mexican Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, and even the Treasury Ministry to 
undertake research on their behalf and to educate them on the budget’s impact.  
 
Another outstanding example is DISHA of India. As note earlier, DISHA first taught 
itself how to carry out simplified structural analysis of the state budget of Gujarat. 
They then learnt how to use the information derived this analysis as the benchmark 
against which actual performance at the field level can be judged. Once they 
discovered that the comparison of budget information with actual field experience 
provides a simple tool with which to hold the officials accountable for their failures, 
they began to arm many other NGOs with this tool, by giving them training in budget 
analysis. So far, DISHA has provided this training to NGOs in the Indian states of 
Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Maharashtra, as well as more than 50 groups in Nepal, all 
of whom are now conducting the work themselves.  
 
These and many other instances of successful attempts to influence the nature of the 
budgets through the power of knowledge clearly underline the principle that fulfilling 
people’s right to information is an essential pre-requisite for enhancing accountability 
in the budgetary process. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Observations 
 
This paper has tried to achieve two things. First, it has tried to clarify at the analytical 
level the kinds of actions that must be taken in order to expand voice and 
accountability in the budgetary process. Secondly, it has reviewed, in the light of the 
proposed analytical framework, a number of case studies from around the world that 
have attempted to expand voice and accountability in the budgetary process.  
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In the context of voice, the paper has identified three analytical categories – voice in 
preference revelation, voice in conflict resolution and voice in impact evaluation. It 
has been argued that all three categories are important, at different stages of the 
budgetary process, if marginalised groups are to gain more from the budget than they 
have in the past. Voice is not sufficient, however, to achieve that goal because it alone 
cannot ensure accountability. In the first place, the voice of marginalised groups must 
be subsumed under the broader notion of participation by the society at large. But 
even participation alone is not enough. The paper has emphasised three distinct, but 
inter-related, pre-requisites of accountability – viz. transparency, participation, and 
knowledge. The case studies were then reviewed in the light of these analytical 
categories of voice and accountability. In this concluding section, we draw upon this 
review to make some points of a general nature. 
 
(1) The paper has reviewed some, and referred to many other, types of social action 
undertaken in a large number of countries for promoting voice and accountability in 
the budgetary process. The cumulative experience of these multifarious activities 
clearly suggests that, with determination and innovative thinking, even as inscrutable 
an entity as a budget can be made sufficiently accessible to ordinary people so that 
they may use it as a vehicle for fighting for their rights – the right to a decent human 
living and the right to participate in the process of development. This does not, 
however, mean that a strategy that has led to success in one context will necessarily 
yield similar success elsewhere. Replicability and scalability of innovative strategies 
is always a difficult issue – the need for adaptation to particular contexts must always 
be borne in mind. 
 
Consider for instance the kind of social auditing that takes place in the villages of 
Rajasthan, India (section II). This has proved to be an excellent strategy for 
confronting officials and elected representatives at the lowest level of government 
with the consequences of their actions. But it is not easy to imagine how such an 
approach can be scaled up to enhance accountability for national-level budgets. The 
strategy works well at the local level because the budgetary provisions at that level 
have direct correspondence with activities whose impact is directly perceived by the 
local people in their daily life. By contrast, the effects of national-level provisions are 
much too diffuse and usually affect people’s daily lives only indirectly through a 
chain effect involving multiple channels. Furthermore, these indirect effects are 
confounded by factors that are beyond the realm of budgetary provisions – for 
example, unexpected change in the business climate, or in the international terms of 
trade, and so on. In this situation, it is not easy to hold the budget-makers accountable 
by comparing budget provisions directly with the life experiences of affected people. 
 
Or consider the case of Porto Alegre in Brazil where people have earned a chance to 
express their voice directly in all three stages of the budgetary process – i.e., 
preference revelation, conflict resolution and impact evaluation. What this pioneering 
effort has achieved is truly remarkable and has justly inspired similar experiments in 
many other cities in Latin America and elsewhere. Once again, however, it is difficult 
to imagine how this kind of direct participation can work at the national level.  
 
This is not to suggest that voice and accountability are not achievable at higher levels 
of government, only that the strategies would have to be different. Of the three pre-
requisites of accountability discussed in this paper – transparency, participation, and   16
knowledge - all three would have to be satisfied, regardless of the level of government 
in question. But when it comes to budgeting at higher levels – especially, the national 
level – participation may have to be indirect, through representatives. And the 
methodology of bringing budget-makers into account may have to rely more on 
careful statistical analyses than on the direct life experience of affected individuals. 
 
(2) This brings us to the second set of issues. If people have to be represented by 
others, doesn’t it bring back all the old worries about the poor and powerless not 
having any voice because there is nobody to represent them? If one looks around the 
fledgling democracies around the Third World, even in the well-established ones such 
as India, it is obvious that the practice of democracy does not necessarily ensure that 
the interests of the disadvantaged groups will be safeguarded when resources are 
allocated at the national level. Their interests can be safeguarded much better when 
they can participate directly in the decision-making process, as in the case of the 
recently revamped Panchayat system of local-level governance in India. 
Decentralisation of governance should therefore be accorded a high priority in any 
programme for expanding voice and accountability.  
 
But there are obvious limits to decentralisation; certain important decisions will 
always have to be taken at higher levels, including the national level. So the question 
arises, what can be done to expand voice and accountability at higher levels, where 
participation will have to be indirect?  
 
A useful lesson can be learnt from the experience of local-level governance itself. 
Experience has shown that even at the local level the mere introduction of 
participatory democracy through legal and administrative fiat does not ensure 
effective participation by the disadvantaged groups. These groups have to be 
organised, often through years of social activism, before they can be sufficiently 
empowered to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by formal introduction 
of participatory democracy. It is notable that behind the success of social auditing in 
Rajasthan lay years of social mobilisation by the MKSS. Similarly, the success of the 
Porto Alegre experiment in Brazil was preceded by many years of dedicated work to 
organise various disadvantaged groups around demands for better access to the city’s 
resources. This kind of social activism has an even more important role to play in the 
national context. It is essential that the civil society organisations that have struggled 
for years for the rights of their target groups be able to participate in budget-making at 
the national level, because they more than anyone else can be expected to represent 
the voice and the interests of their people. It is not being suggested that these groups 
be allowed to usurp the powers and rights of elected representatives. The idea is really 
to allow them to act as a countervailing power so that the elected representatives as 
well as government officials can be reminded of their obligations to those they are 
supposed to serve. South Africa in particular, and to a lesser extent Uganda, have 
already proceeded quite far along this route towards implementing a participatory 
process of budget-making at the national level. Other countries have much to learn 
from them. 
 
(3) While noting the importance of social activism in the context of budget-making, it 
should be emphasised that the reach of social activism must extend far beyond the 
budgetary process, even for the sake of pro-poor budgeting itself. This is because it 
will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve voice and accountability in the   17
budgetary process unless similar reforms occur in the overall structure of governance. 
A governance structure that is not open, participatory and transparent in any other 
sphere cannot be expected to be so simply in its budgetary process. On the contrary, it 
is quite likely, given the crucial importance of budgets, that an otherwise open 
government might like to hold on to the budgetary process as the last bastion of 
secluded and secretive decision-making. 
 
The other side of the coin of course is that if a social movement succeeds in piercing 
the veil of obscurity surrounding the jealously guarded process of budget-making, 
then it should open the way for greater transparency and participation in other spheres 
of governance as well. In other words, greater voice and accountability in the 
budgetary process has a rich potential of transforming itself into greater voice and 
accountability  through the budgetary process. There is thus a potential synergy 
between efforts to ensure greater voice and accountability in the budgetary process 
and the move toward introducing greater transparency and participation in the overall 
structure of governance – the two are mutually reinforcing. Social activism must try to 
exploit this synergy in full. 
 
(4) It is sometimes argued that the very nature of the budget imposes severe limits to 
how far voice and accountability can be reasonably introduced in the budgetary 
process. Secrecy, allegedly, is a virtue at the stage of budget preparation because 
openness might lead to undesirable consequences such as uncertainty in the financial 
market, or undue pressure from vested interest groups, and so on. When scrutinised, 
most of these arguments are found to be hollow and rather self-serving in nature.
4 
Even if there are genuine limits to openness, however, that cannot be allowed to be an 
excuse for shielding the budgetary process completely from the movement for open 
government that is currently under way. In fact, the very existence of limits calls for 
maximum possible openness and participation, for two reasons. 
 
First, if genuine limits do exist, the executive should be able to explain in a rational 
manner how and why they exist. In that case, a genuinely participatory and informed 
decision-making process will accept the explanation, thereby legitimising the part of 
budget-making that remains beyond the realm of public scrutiny. In the absence of 
such legitimisation, any attempt to shield the budgetary process from public gaze 
would remain subject to abuse, and even sincere pleading would appear self-serving. 
 
Second, the executive still has to be accountable for the protected domain, and this is 
only possible through a participatory process. The non-executive participants in the 
budgetary process may agree to relinquish their right to join the deliberations that take 
place inside the executive over the protected domain, but they can still require the 
executive to set measurable targets in respect of that domain. These mutually agreed 
targets will be the benchmarks against which they would then be able to hold the 
executive accountable. The point is simply that if the executive is to be allowed to 
have an exclusive control over a part of the budget and cannot be questioned on its 
formulation, then at least it must be questioned on performance, if there is to be any 
accountability at all. But such questioning can only be effective within a framework 
of participatory budgeting. 
 
                                                             
4 For an especially thorough scrutiny, undertaken in the context of economic governance as a whole but 
also applicable to the specific context of the budget, see Stiglitz (1999).   18
(5) This paper has emphasised the importance of instituting a participatory process of 
decision-making for ensuring effective accountability, but it is also important to 
recognise the limits of participation. It has already been noted that participation can 
only be indirect at higher levels of decision-making and in some cases participation 
may not be possible at all, e.g. in the protected domain of the budgetary process that 
may have to remain secretive for tactical reasons. A more general limitation is that 
people may not want to participate in each and every instance of decision-making, 
even if they had the right and the opportunity to do so. The time and effort that people 
need to invest in order to exercise their right to participate have an opportunity cost, 
and in many cases the expected return from participation may not be worth the cost. 
All this makes it unreasonable to expect that it will always be possible to hold the 
authorities to account through a process in which their actions are directly scrutinised 
by the people. 
 
This raises the difficult question of how to ensure accountability when participation is 
of necessity limited or absent altogether. It may be useful to distinguish here between 
two approaches that may be characterised as ex ante and ex post accountability. Ex 
post accountability refers to the case where the authorities are held to account ex post 
on the basis of observed actions and their outcomes. Participation will have to play a 
big role in this approach. By contrast, ex ante accountability refers to the approach in 
which accountability is ensured not by observing the actions or their outcomes once 
they become apparent but by laying down certain procedures beforehand that the 
authorities are required to follow. The idea is to devise ‘incentive compatible’ 
procedures. These will have the dual property that the authorities will have the 
incentive to abide by those procedures of their own accord and in doing so they will 
automatically promote the goals that the people want them to pursue. The virtue of ex 
ante accountability is that once the right procedures are put in place, the people need 
not monitor the detailed actions or their outcomes. The need for direct participation 
can thus be minimised in this approach, even though an initial round of participation 
will still be needed while devising the incentive compatible procedures. How to 
devise such procedures remains an important challenge in any programme to improve 
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